Gas Turbine Inspection SWMS
Internal inspection of combustion gas turbines — fuel gas isolation and purge, cooldown to entry temperature, combustor / casing confined-space entry, borescope and visual NDT, blade and seal inspection, recommissioning lockout sequence.
SWMS variants reference your state’s WHS legislation. Instant download after payment.
Gas turbine inspection covers the internal inspection of a combustion gas turbine during a planned outage — fuel-gas isolation and purge, cooldown to a safe entry temperature, confined-space entry into the combustor and casing, borescope and visual non-destructive testing, inspection of blades and seals, and the recommissioning lockout sequence. The work brings together two of the most demanding hazard families in power generation: entry into a confined space that has held hot combustion products and fuel gas, and work in proximity to a pressurised fuel-gas distribution system that must be positively isolated before any entry. Both are independent High-Risk Construction Work triggers, and a documented safe system of work is required before the outage work begins.
The defining risks are the residual heat of the machine, the potential for a flammable or oxygen-deficient atmosphere in the casing, and the stored energy in the fuel-gas system. A turbine casing can remain hot enough to cause burns and to drive workers to heat stress for a long period after shutdown, and the fuel-gas line must be isolated, depressurised, and purged so no gas can migrate into the space during entry. The confined-space controls follow AS 2865, the isolation and lock-out controls follow the energy-isolation principles for the fuel-gas and electrical systems, and atmospheric monitoring is continuous throughout the entry.
This SWMS is jurisdiction-neutral within Australia and written to the model WHS framework. Victoria operates under the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 and OHS Regulations 2017 — check the VIC-specific variant for the local equivalents of the duties and codes cited here.
Hazards identified
13 hazards covered, sorted by priority.
Explosion or flash fire if fuel gas migrates into the combustor or casing during entry and finds an ignition source, causing fatal burn and blast injury.
Asphyxiation in the enclosed combustor or casing where purge gas or combustion products have displaced breathable air.
Serious thermal burns from contact with hot surfaces, and heat stress, when entry occurs before the machine has cooled to a safe temperature.
Fire, explosion, or asphyxiation from an uncontrolled release if the fuel-gas system is not positively isolated, depressurised, and purged before work.
Crush, entanglement, or fatal impact if the shaft turns while a worker is inside the casing, from turning gear, residual rotation, or windmilling.
Electric shock or arc from generator, excitation, or auxiliary systems not isolated and proven de-energised before entry.
Inability to self-rescue or be rescued promptly from a casing with a single small access point if the worker is injured or the atmosphere deteriorates.
Heat exhaustion or heat stroke working in a hot, enclosed casing for an extended borescope or visual inspection.
Musculoskeletal injury manoeuvring borescope rigging and tooling in the cramped, awkward casing interior.
Sprain, fracture, or fall on oily, curved, or congested internal surfaces and at the casing access point.
Respiratory or skin irritation from contact with or inhalation of carbon and combustion deposits disturbed during inspection.
Noise-induced hearing loss working near other operating units in the station during the inspection.
Equipment damage on recommissioning or struck-by injury if a tool is dropped within the casing and not recovered before close-out.
Control measures
Hierarchy-of-controls order: elimination → substitution → isolation → engineering → administrative → PPE.
- 1Positively isolate the fuel-gas system before any entry — close and lock the isolation valves, install slip plates or double-block-and-bleed, depressurise, and purge the casing — and prove the absence of fuel gas by atmospheric test before entry is permitted.
- 2Cool the machine to a verified safe entry temperature before entry, and monitor casing temperature throughout, scheduling the inspection only once cooldown criteria are met.
- 3Treat the combustor and casing as a confined space to AS 2865 — atmospheric test for oxygen, flammable gas, and contaminants before and continuously during entry, work to an entry permit, and post a trained stand-by attendant at the access point.
- 4Positively isolate and lock the turbine drive — engage the turning-gear lockout or rotor restraint so the shaft cannot rotate, and verify the lock before any worker enters the casing.
- 5Isolate and prove de-energised the generator, excitation, and auxiliary electrical systems to AS/NZS 4836 before entry, and verify the absence of voltage at the work points.
- 6Resource a confined-space rescue plan with trained rescuers and retrieval equipment suited to the small casing access point, so an injured worker can be recovered promptly without relying on delayed external rescue.
- 7Manage heat stress with cooldown verification, ventilation of the casing, hydration, work-rest cycles, and physiological monitoring during the entry.
- 8Use mechanical aids and team handling for borescope rigging and tooling, and maintain a tool-control and accountability system so nothing is left inside the machine at close-out.
- 9Maintain housekeeping and footing controls at the access point and inside the casing, and provide respiratory protection for combustion-deposit exposure where atmospheric controls cannot fully eliminate it.
- 10Signpost and manage noise zones around adjacent operating plant and provide hearing protection appropriate to the outage environment.
- 11Execute a controlled recommissioning lockout sequence — confirm all personnel and tools are clear, remove locks and isolations in the correct order, and re-pressurise and re-energise only under permit with the casing confirmed clear.
- 12Provide PPE as the final layer — heat-resistant clothing and gloves for residual heat, respiratory protection for deposits and during purge verification, eye protection, and atmospheric monitors — inspected before entry.
- 13Verify confined-space entry, gas-isolation, and electrical-isolation competencies for the crew, and brief every worker on the SWMS, the isolation plan, and the rescue plan before entry.
Applicable Codes of Practice
Becomes legally binding under Section 26A of the WHS Act from 1 July 2026. Governs combustor and casing entry — atmospheric testing, entry permits, stand-by attendant, and rescue arrangements.
Becomes legally binding under Section 26A from 1 July 2026. Governs the isolation, depressurisation, and purge of the pressurised fuel-gas system and the control of a flammable atmosphere.
Confined spaces. Provides the technical basis for atmospheric testing, entry permits, stand-by attendants, and rescue arrangements for the casing entry.
Becomes legally binding under Section 26A from 1 July 2026. Governs the isolation and proving de-energised of the generator, excitation, and auxiliary systems before entry.
Safe working on or near low-voltage and high-voltage electrical installations and equipment. Provides the test-prove-test methodology for proving the electrical auxiliaries de-energised.
Pipelines — gas and liquid petroleum. Informs the safe isolation and purge practice for the fuel-gas distribution system feeding the turbine where pipeline-class fuel gas is involved.
High-Risk Construction Work triggered
The combustor and casing are enclosed spaces with a single restricted access point, not designed for continuous occupancy, with a potential for a flammable or oxygen-deficient atmosphere from residual fuel gas and purge. Internal inspection requires entry into this space, which is confined-space work under WHS Regulation s. 291.
The turbine is fed by a pressurised fuel-gas distribution system that must be isolated, depressurised, and purged before entry. Working on and in proximity to this pressurised gas piping to isolate it for the inspection satisfies the s. 291 trigger for pressurised gas distribution.
Failure to prepare a SWMS before High-Risk Construction Work commences is a contravention of WHS Regulation s. 291. Category 2 offences under WHS Act s. 32 — where a duty breach exposes a person to a risk of death or serious injury without proof of recklessness — attract substantial monetary penalties for body corporates and individual duty holders; refer to the current SafeWork NSW penalty schedule for the NSW-indexed 2025-26 figures. Category 1 reckless-conduct offences under WHS Act s. 31 attract up to approximately $10.42 million for a body corporate, $2.17 million for an individual PCBU or officer, and $1.04 million for an individual worker, with up to 10 years' imprisonment (NSW-indexed at 1 July 2025). VIC maximum penalties under the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 differ in structure and amount and are set at VIC variant-generation time.
Who this is for
- →Power-station outage teams performing scheduled gas-turbine inspections during a planned shutdown.
- →Specialist turbine-service contractors mobilised for borescope and internal NDT inspection.
- →Mechanical maintenance crews entering the combustor and casing for blade and seal assessment.
- →Station asset owners requiring a defensible confined-space SWMS from their turbine service providers.
- →NDT and inspection technicians performing borescope and visual examination of the hot gas path.
What you receive
- ✓Editable Microsoft Word .docx — open in Word or Google Docs, drop in your company logo and ABN.
- ✓State-specific variant matched to the jurisdiction selected at checkout (NSW, VIC, QLD, SA, WA, TAS, NT, or ACT).
- ✓All 13 hazards risk-assessed with inherent and residual ratings against a documented control set.
- ✓Isolation and confined-space controls referenced to AS 2865, AS 2885, AS/NZS 4836, and the model codes.
- ✓Reg 291 HRCW breakdown showing the confined-space and pressurised-gas triggers and the legal duty to prepare the SWMS first.
- ✓CIH-reviewed content written to be defended in front of a station outage manager or a SafeWork inspector.
- ✓Instant download on payment, with a re-download window so you can retrieve the file again if needed.
- ✓Sign-on register and review-log structure ready for site-specific completion by the PCBU.
Worked example
A combined-cycle power station in Queensland schedules a major outage to borescope-inspect one of its gas turbines after a fired-hours interval. A specialist turbine-service contractor is engaged for the internal inspection over a five-day window. Because the work triggers two High-Risk Construction Work categories — confined space and pressurised gas distribution — a SWMS is prepared before the outage, using this product with the QLD variant which references the state framework. The fuel-gas system is positively isolated with double-block-and-bleed, depressurised, and the casing purged, and the absence of fuel gas is proven by atmospheric test. The machine is cooled to the verified safe entry temperature before anyone enters, with casing temperature monitored throughout. The turning gear is locked out so the shaft cannot rotate, and the generator and auxiliary electrical systems are proven de-energised to AS/NZS 4836. The combustor is entered as a confined space to AS 2865 — entry permit, continuous atmospheric monitoring, and a stand-by attendant — with a rescue plan and retrieval equipment suited to the small access point in place. The borescope inspection of blades and seals proceeds with tool accountability so nothing is left inside the machine. Heat stress is managed with ventilation, hydration, and work-rest cycles. On completion the recommissioning lockout sequence confirms all personnel and tools are clear before re-pressurisation and re-energisation under permit. The inspection is completed without an incident, and the signed SWMS and permits form part of the outage records.
Related legislation
- Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (NSW) — Sections 19 (primary duty of care), 31 (Category 1 offence), 32 (Category 2 offence)
- Work Health and Safety Regulation 2017 (NSW) — Sections 291 (HRCW definition), 299 (SWMS), 66-77 (confined spaces)
- AS 2865-2009 — Confined spaces (atmospheric testing, entry permits, rescue arrangements)
- AS 2885 series — Pipelines — gas and liquid petroleum (fuel-gas isolation and purge)
- AS/NZS 4836:2023 — Safe working on or near low-voltage and high-voltage electrical installations and equipment
Frequently asked questions
Why does gas turbine inspection need a SWMS before work starts?
The internal inspection triggers two Reg 291 High-Risk Construction Work categories — entry into a confined space (the combustor and casing) and work on or near pressurised gas distribution (the fuel-gas system that must be isolated). A SWMS is a legal requirement before HRCW commences, and the work also carries severe heat, atmosphere, and stored-energy risks that the document controls.
How is the fuel-gas hazard controlled before entry?
The fuel-gas system is positively isolated with locked valves and slip plates or double-block-and-bleed, depressurised, and the casing is purged, with the absence of fuel gas proven by atmospheric test before entry is permitted. This is treated as a distinct control set from the confined-space entry itself, because a residual fuel-gas atmosphere is the highest-consequence hazard in the casing.
How is unexpected turbine rotation prevented?
The turning gear is locked out or the rotor is restrained before any worker enters the casing, and the lock is verified, so the shaft cannot rotate from turning gear, residual rotation, or windmilling while a worker is inside. This mechanical isolation is part of the multi-energy lockout alongside the fuel-gas and electrical isolations.
What rescue arrangements are required for the casing?
Because the combustor and casing have a single small access point, the SWMS requires a confined-space rescue plan with trained rescuers and retrieval equipment matched to that access, so an injured worker can be recovered promptly rather than waiting on delayed external rescue. The rescue capability is in place before entry, consistent with AS 2865.
Does the SWMS cover recommissioning as well as inspection?
Yes. The SWMS includes the recommissioning lockout sequence — confirming all personnel and tools are clear, removing locks and isolations in the correct order, and re-pressurising and re-energising under permit. Recommissioning is treated as a controlled phase because re-introducing fuel gas and electrical energy with the casing not confirmed clear is itself a high-consequence step.