Hendra Virus Risk SWMS (Equine)
Hendra virus exposure prevention for veterinarians, equine workers, and farriers — vaccination programme, PPE for suspected cases, decontamination, and public health notification.
SWMS variants reference your state’s WHS legislation. Instant download after payment.
Hendra virus (HeV) is a zoonotic paramyxovirus carried by flying foxes that spills over into horses and, from infected horses, into humans handling them. Documented Australian human cases have a case fatality rate exceeding 50%, and there is no licensed human vaccine or proven antiviral therapy. Veterinarians, veterinary nurses, equine workers, farriers, and stable hands face exposure through respiratory secretions, nasal discharge, saliva, blood, and urine from sick or recently deceased horses — frequently before Hendra is clinically suspected. WHS Regulations across all Australian jurisdictions require PCBUs to identify biological hazards, eliminate or minimise risk so far as reasonably practicable, and consult workers on control measures. The Biosecurity Act 2015 (Cth) and Biosecurity Queensland's Hendra virus guidelines impose mandatory notification, isolation, and movement-restriction duties. A documented SWMS is the legally defensible mechanism for demonstrating these duties have been discharged before any sick-horse assessment, post-mortem, or unvaccinated-horse handling commences.
Hazards identified
7 hazards covered, sorted by priority.
Acute Hendra infection causing encephalitis or pneumonitis; case fatality exceeds 50% with no licensed human treatment
Inhalation of virus-laden droplets leading to systemic infection, prolonged hospitalisation, and potential death of worker
Direct bloodstream introduction of virus bypassing mucosal barriers; recognised transmission route in confirmed human fatalities
Viral entry through compromised skin barrier; documented exposure pathway requiring immediate post-exposure assessment and surveillance
Mucous membrane exposure during PPE removal; common breach point identified in retrospective case investigations
Unprotected exposure before Hendra is suspected; majority of confirmed human cases arose from undiagnosed equine cases
Fomite-mediated viral transfer to subsequent properties; biosecurity breach attracting regulator enforcement and movement restrictions
Control measures
Hierarchy-of-controls order: elimination → substitution → isolation → engineering → administrative → PPE.
- 1Elimination — Refuse to attend or examine any sick horse on a property until owner confirms vaccination status and clinical signs are triaged by phone against Hendra case definition.
- 2Elimination — Cease all on-site post-mortems of horses with unexplained acute illness; defer sample collection to government veterinary laboratory under formal biosecurity submission.
- 3Substitution — Replace direct clinical examination of suspect cases with remote video triage, owner-collected swabs under instruction, and laboratory-confirmed exclusion before hands-on contact.
- 4Substitution — Substitute open nasogastric intubation with closed sampling systems and sealed swab kits that prevent aerosol release during specimen collection.
- 5Engineering — Erect portable isolation yards minimum 10 metres from other horses, use disposable plastic-lined examination zones, and position downwind of workers during all procedures.
- 6Engineering — Use sharps containers at point of use, retractable safety needles, and sealed double-bagged carcass disposal compliant with Biosecurity Queensland Hendra Field Guide requirements.
- 7Administrative — Maintain mandatory vaccination of all routinely handled horses with Equivac HeV, document refusals in writing, and apply enhanced PPE protocol for every unvaccinated patient.
- 8Administrative — Conduct documented pre-task Hendra risk assessment per AVA guideline before each call-out, record consultation with workers, and notify Biosecurity Queensland of suspect cases within 24 hours.
- 9PPE — Don P2/N95 respirator (fit-tested), full-face shield or sealed goggles, fluid-resistant coveralls, double nitrile gloves, and impervious boot covers before approaching any suspect horse.
- 10PPE — Follow supervised buddy-system doffing in designated dirty-to-clean zone, shower on-site where practicable, and double-bag contaminated PPE for incineration per AS/NZS 3816 clinical waste handling.
Applicable Codes of Practice
Establishes the recognised standard of care for Hendra risk assessment, PPE selection, and clinical decision-making against which PCBU duty is measured.
Mandates fit-testing, training, and maintenance of P2/N95 respirators used during examination of suspect Hendra horses and post-mortem activities.
Imposes statutory duty to notify suspected Hendra cases, restrict horse movements, and comply with directions from a biosecurity inspector.
Requires hierarchy of control application, worker consultation, and documented review of biological hazard controls including zoonotic disease exposure.
High-Risk Construction Work triggered
Hendra virus is classified as a Risk Group 4 pathogen requiring BSL-4 containment for culture; field exposure to infected horses constitutes hazardous biological agent contact under WHS biological-hazard duties.
PCBU must document risk assessment, consult workers, retain exposure records for 30 years under WHS Regulation health monitoring provisions; penalties for Category 1 reckless breach are substantial and indexed, with the current maximum following the prevailing WHS schedule.
Who this is for
- →Mixed and equine veterinary practices across Australia
- →Farriers and equine dental technicians servicing multiple properties
- →Thoroughbred and performance horse stable managers
- →Veterinary nurses and equine post-mortem technicians
What you receive
- ✓Editable DOCX template — Microsoft Word compatible
- ✓State-specific WHS legislation schedule (NSW/VIC/QLD/SA/WA/TAS/NT/ACT)
- ✓Hazard register with risk ratings + hierarchy-of-control mapping
- ✓Worker sign-on register, pre-start checklist, and incident escalation flow
Worked example
A regional equine veterinary practice receives an after-hours call about a 9-year-old gelding with acute fever, ataxia, and nasal discharge on a property where vaccination status is unknown. The on-call veterinarian opens the Hendra Virus Risk SWMS on her tablet during the drive and conducts the pre-attendance phone triage exactly as the SWMS prescribes — confirming clinical signs meet the Hendra case definition and that the horse is unvaccinated. At the property gate she conducts a documented pre-start brief with the accompanying veterinary nurse, both signing the SWMS register and confirming P2 respirator fit-test currency. They establish a dirty-to-clean zone on the tailgate, don full PPE per the PPE control line, and instruct the owner to remain 10 metres upwind. During examination the horse coughs, generating unanticipated aerosol; the vet pauses, references the SWMS aerosol control, and elects to halt further oral examination and collect only blood and nasal swabs through the closed sampling kit. They notify Biosecurity Queensland by phone before leaving the property, double-bag PPE for incineration, and complete the post-task exposure log. The SWMS adjustment — abandoning the planned dental exam — is recorded as a dynamic control change and reviewed at the practice safety meeting that week.
Related legislation
- WHS Act 2011 (model)
- WHS Regulation 2025
- Code of Practice — Hazardous Manual Tasks