BESS Lithium-Ion Battery Installation & Commissioning SWMS
Grid-scale battery energy storage installation β DC arc-flash, thermal runaway management, fire suppression integration, commissioning grid-tie. AS/NZS 5139 + NSW BESS Code of Practice. Megawatt-class projects.
SWMS variants reference your stateβs WHS legislation. Instant download after payment.
Grid-scale Battery Energy Storage System (BESS) installation and commissioning involves assembling megawatt-class lithium-ion battery containers, terminating high-voltage DC string cabling, integrating fire detection and suppression systems, and energising power conversion systems for grid-tie. The work exposes electrical workers, riggers and commissioning engineers to DC arc-flash energies exceeding 40 cal/cmΒ², thermal runaway propagation risk, stranded energy in partially-charged modules, and confined working conditions inside ISO-format battery enclosures. WHS Regulation 2025 classifies energised electrical work above extra-low voltage and crane-assisted module placement as High Risk Construction Work, mandating a documented Safe Work Method Statement before any worker accesses site. This SWMS addresses the full installation sequence from container craneage through DC bus commissioning, aligned to AS/NZS 5139:2019 battery system requirements, the NSW BESS Code of Practice (2024), AS/NZS 3000 wiring rules and AS/NZS 4836 for low-voltage electrical work. It is mandatory under section 299 of the WHS Regulation and must be developed in consultation with the workers performing the task.
Hazards identified
7 hazards covered, sorted by priority.
Third-degree burns, retinal damage, pressure-wave lung injury; fatality within seconds at incident energies above 40 cal/cmΒ²
Toxic hydrogen fluoride and carbon monoxide release, jet-fire and explosion enveloping installation crew inside enclosure
Electrocution from assumed-dead conductors carrying up to 1500 VDC; ventricular fibrillation and cardiac arrest
Crush fatality, container drop onto energised equipment triggering cascading thermal event across the substation footprint
Fractured spine, traumatic brain injury or fatality from unprotected edge or fragile roof penetration
Oxygen displacement asphyxiation, hearing damage from discharge pressure wave, evacuation injuries in confined enclosure
Heat exhaustion progressing to heat stroke, impaired judgement leading to electrical contact or procedural error
Control measures
Hierarchy-of-controls order: elimination β substitution β isolation β engineering β administrative β PPE.
- 1Elimination β Sequence works so all DC string commissioning occurs before adjacent racks are energised, eliminating live parallel work entirely from the program.
- 2Elimination β Remove module pre-charge state during transport and craneage; modules arrive at lowest practicable state of charge per AS/NZS 5139 Clause 2.3.
- 3Substitution β Substitute manual DC terminations with factory-pre-terminated Amphenol connectors rated to 1500 VDC, removing field crimping inside live-adjacent enclosures.
- 4Substitution β Replace conventional crane lifts with self-propelled modular transporter where ground conditions permit, reducing dynamic load over energised assets.
- 5Engineering β Install lockable DC isolators on each battery rack with visible break and earthing studs verified to AS/NZS 4836; arc-flash boundary calculated per IEEE 1584.
- 6Engineering β Maintain continuous gas detection (H2, CO, HF) inside enclosures with automatic ventilation interlock and remote-trip to PCS per NSW BESS Code of Practice.
- 7Administrative β Issue daily electrical access permit signed by HV operator and commissioning engineer; permit references this SWMS and current single-line diagram.
- 8Administrative β Pre-start brief at start of each shift covering thermal runaway evacuation route, suppression system status and arc-flash boundary for the day's work front.
- 9PPE β Category 4 arc-rated suit (40 cal/cmΒ² minimum), Class 0 insulated gloves with leather protectors, arc-rated balaclava and face shield for any work inside the arc-flash boundary.
- 10PPE β Self-contained escape respirator (15-minute minimum) carried by every worker inside battery enclosure during initial energisation and first full charge cycle.
Applicable Codes of Practice
Mandates fire separation, ventilation, signage and commissioning test regime for the battery system; non-compliance voids DNSP grid connection approval.
Governs DC and AC switchgear selection, earthing arrangements and verification testing applicable to the PCS and auxiliary supplies on the BESS site.
Sets minimum separation distances, hazard mitigation analysis and emergency response planning required for grid-scale BESS deployments in NSW.
Specifies isolation, testing for dead and access permit requirements that underpin the SWMS sequence for working on DC strings and AC switchgear.
High-Risk Construction Work triggered
Rooftop cable tray, conduit and PV-canopy interface work above container roofs routinely exceeds 2 metres without permanent edge protection during the install phase.
DC string commissioning, PCS energisation and grid-tie tests are performed on or near conductors at 1500 VDC and 33 kV AC with arc-flash exposure.
Crawler cranes, telehandlers and forklifts are used to place battery containers and PCS skids over live and pedestrian work zones throughout the installation.
PCBU must prepare, consult workers on, and retain this SWMS for the duration of the work plus two years after a notifiable incident; penalties for Category 1 reckless conduct breaches are substantial and indexed, with current maximums following the prevailing WHS schedule.
Who this is for
- βEPC contractors delivering utility-scale BESS projects
- βHV commissioning engineers on grid-connection works
- βElectrical contractors licensed for energy storage installation
- βPrincipal contractors on renewable firming infrastructure
What you receive
- βEditable DOCX template β Microsoft Word compatible
- βState-specific WHS legislation schedule (NSW/VIC/QLD/SA/WA/TAS/NT/ACT)
- βHazard register with risk ratings + hierarchy-of-control mapping
- βWorker sign-on register, pre-start checklist, and incident escalation flow
Worked example
On a 200 MW / 400 MWh BESS firming project in regional New South Wales, the commissioning supervisor opens this SWMS at the 06:30 pre-start brief in the site office before crews enter the battery yard. The day's task is to terminate and commission DC strings 17 through 24 on row C, while rows A and B remain energised feeding the PCS for factory acceptance testing. Working through the hazard register, the supervisor identifies that DC arc-flash and stranded energy are the day's controlling hazards because adjacent strings are live. The crew selects controls from the SWMS: Category 4 arc-rated PPE, lockable DC isolators verified with a calibrated 1500 VDC tester, and the daily electrical access permit signed by the HV operator. Each worker signs the SWMS sign-on sheet, confirming they understand the arc-flash boundary marked at 2.4 metres and the evacuation route to the muster point upwind of the enclosure. Mid-shift, the gas detection system alarms on a low-level hydrogen reading in enclosure C-19. Because the SWMS pre-defines this trigger, the crew immediately stops work, evacuates to the muster point, and the supervisor escalates to the OEM for module inspection β no improvisation required. Work resumes only after the reading clears, ventilation runs for 30 minutes, and the permit is reissued. The completed SWMS, sign-on sheet and permit are filed for the statutory retention period.
Related legislation
- WHS Act 2011 (model)
- WHS Regulation 2025
- AS/NZS 3000 β Electrical installations